decisions to archive and share these data are primarily made by individual researchers. In 23 this paper we analyse, within a game theoretical framework, how sharing and reuse of 24 research data affect individuals who share or do not share their datasets. We construct a 25 model in which there is a cost associated with sharing datasets whereas reusing such sets 26 implies a benefit. In our calculations conflicting interests appeared for researchers. 27 Individual researchers are always better off not sharing and omitting the sharing cost, at the 28 same time both sharing and not sharing researchers are better off if (almost) all researchers 29 share. Namely, the more researchers share, the more benefit can be gained by the reuse of 30 those datasets. We simulated several policy measures to increase benefits for researchers 31 sharing or reusing datasets. Results point out that, although policies should be able to 32 increase the rate of sharing researchers, and increased discoverability and dataset quality 33 could partly compensate for costs, a better measure would be to directly lower the costs for 34 sharing, or even turn it into a (citation-) benefit. Making data available would in that case 35 become the most profitable, and therefore stable, strategy. This means researchers would Introduction 40 While sharing datasets has group benefits for the scientific community and society as a [Antman, 2014] . Also, datasets are perceived as intellectual property and researchers simply 52 do not want others to benefit from it [Vickers, 2011] . 53 In contrast, the act of sharing research data could have advantageous consequences. 54 Scientific outreach might be extended into other than the original research areas [Chao, 55 2011], and researchers' reputations could grow by the publicity of good sharing practices, 56 possibly initiating new collaborations. In genetics [Botstein, 2010; Piwowar and Vision, 2013] 57 it was calculated that papers with open data were cited more than studies without the data PrePrints available. This citation advantage was also found in other disciplines like astronomy 59 [Henneken E.A., 2011; Dorch, 2012] and oceanography [Sears, 2011] . As citations to papers 60 for many disciplines are a key metric by which impact of researchers is measured, this could 61 mean a very important incentive to researchers for sharing their data. Moreover, there is a 62 tendency to regard datasets as research output that can be used as a citeable reference or 63 source in their own right [Costello et al., 2013; Neumann and Brase, 2014] . For the field of 64 oceanography it was found that datasets can be cited even more than most papers [Belter, 65 2014]. This would mean that sharing datasets in the near future could have a direct positive 66 influence on a researcher's scientific impact. 67 On the other side of the coin, a researcher who reuses a dataset that was shared can 68 gain several advantages. Time is saved in not having to collect or produce the data, which 69 can be put to use to produce more papers. Papers can be enhanced with a comparison or 70 meta-analysis based on an extra dataset. If the added dataset merits publication in a higher 71 impact journal, the paper could be cited more often. In more general terms, the scientific 72 community can benefit from reuse of datasets. Tang, 2013] . It also is a way to prevent scientific fraud; with the dataset provided one should 78 be able to reproduce scientific results. 79 To summarize, data sharing implies costs and/or benefits for the individual 80 researcher, but are of clear benefit to researchers that reuse the dataset, and to the 81 scientific community as a whole. In this context, the problem of data sharing can be studied 82 as a game-theoretical problem. The strength of game theory lies in the methodology it 83 provides for structuring and analysing problems of strategic choice. The players, their 84 strategic options, the external factors of influence on those decisions, all have to be made 85 explicit. With our model we show how research data sharing fits the definition of a typical 86 'tragedy of the commons', in which cooperating is the best strategy but cheating is the 87 evolutionary stable strategy. In addition, we assess measures for altering costs and benefits 88 with sharing and reuse and analyse how each measure would turn the balance towards more 89 sharing and more benefits from sharing, benefitting the community, society and the 90 individual researcher. A Model for Impact 95 We assume a community of researchers who publish papers. We consider two types of 96 researchers: those sharing and not sharing research data associated with those papers. We 97 make the simplifying assumption that the goal for both types of researchers is to perform 98 well by making a significant contribution to science, i.e. to have a large impact on science. 
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We assume that produced papers, P s for sharers and P ns for non sharers, create impact by 100 getting cited a number of times c. The fixity of c means we do not distinguish between low 101 and highly cited papers. To increase their performance, researchers need to be efficient, i.e. 102 they should try to minimize the time spend on producing a paper, so more papers can be 103 produced within the same timeframe. Papers from which the dataset is shared gain an extra 104 citation advantage and this adds to the impact of that paper with b. In our model we 105 consider only papers with a dataset as a basis, i.e. no review or opinion papers. So, the 106 performance of researchers is expressed as an impact rate, in terms of citations per year, i.e. 107 the impact for sharing and non-sharing researchers is defined as
(1) 109 From the above expressions it is clear that the difference in impact between sharing and not 110 sharing researchers is to a large extent dependent on the number of publications P per year. 111 These publications can be expressed in terms of an average time to write a paper T s for 112 sharers and T ns for not sharers. (2) 114 The time T consists of several elements that we make explicit here. Each paper costs time t a 115 to produce. Producing the associated dataset costs a certain time t d . Sharing a dataset 116 implies a time cost t c . We do not distinguish between large and small efforts to prepare a 117 dataset for sharing; all datasets take the same amount of time. We assume there is a certain 118 probability f for each researcher for each paper to find an appropriate dataset for their 119 paper from the pool of shared datasets X, in which case they avoid the time needed to 120 produce a dataset t d . We do acknowledge that some time is needed for a good 'getting to 121 know' the external dataset and to process it, resembled in the time cost t r . We calculate the 122 time to produce a paper by
In these formulae, the pool of available datasets X determines the value of the terms with t d 125 and t r . When X is close to zero, the term with t d approaches t d . This implies that everybody 126 has to produce their own dataset with time cost t d . On the contrary, when X is very large the 127 term approaches zero, implying almost everyone can reuse a dataset and almost no time is 128 spent in the community to produce datasets. Between these two extremes, the term first 129 rapidly declines with increasing X and then ever more slowly approaches zero (see the plots 130 in the last column in the figure in Appendix 2). This is under the assumption that at a small 131 number of available datasets, adding datasets will have a profound influence on the reuse 132 possibilities. If datasets are already superfluous, adding extra datasets will have less 133 influence on the reuse rate. The term representing the effort to reuse a paper t r works 134 opposite to the term representing t d . When X is close to zero, the term approaches zero, PrePrints implying nobody spends time to prepare a set for reuse. When X is very large the term 136 approaches t r ; everyone spends this time because everyone has found a set for reuse. 
Using Formula (2) and (3) with the system at steady state i.e. d t X = 0, the pool size X as 155 function of the publication parameters and the size of the group of sharing researchers is 156 given by researcher is assigned at random to individual researchers, based on the distribution in 175 Figure 1 . We do not yet consider any costs nor benefits from sharing and reusing datasets.
As a next step we introduce parameters that have to do with sharing. The percentage of 178 sharing researchers is a fixed parameter in this model. The researchers sharing type is 179 assigned at random to individuals. The reuse of a dataset, based on the probability to find an 180 appropriate set for a paper, is assigned at random to publications. The portion of papers R 181 for which an appropriate dataset for reuse is found is calculated as
We now have a mix of individual researchers that share or do not share, find a dataset for 184 reuse or not for any of their papers, and publish different number of papers in a year. Based 185 on the parameters in Table 2 we assign costs and benefits with these traits. These factors 186 determine the performance of researchers in terms of impact by citations. To determine the publication rate distribution in Formula (6) we sampled the bibliographic 194 database Scopus (for results, see Figure 1 ). We selected the first four papers for each of the 195 26 subject areas in Scopus-indexed papers, published in 2013. If a paper appeared within the 196 first four in more than one subject area, it was replaced by the next paper in that subject Simulations 208 We start with a set of simulations regarding performances per sharing type, with the model 209 for impact. We calculate the impact for the two types of researchers over a range of sharing 210 from zero to a hundred percent. In addition to the default values (see Table 2 ), we change 211 parameters to assess their influence on the publication rate and associated impact by 212 citations for sharing and not sharing researchers. In Table 1 we list the parameters changed 213 in the simulations and a score of the measures that would have these effects in a 'real world' Table 1 and assess their influence, 220 as in the first simulation. 221 We end by zooming out to community performance with the model for impact. We Figure 2 shows the potential of the citation benefit with sharing. In the picture it is profitable 261 to share at low sharing rates, and profitable not to share at high sharing rates, leading to a 262 stable coexistence of sharing and not sharing researchers. This means that the community 263 would exist of researchers from both strategies. Hypothetically, should the citation benefit 264 be even higher, the sharing strategy would outperform the not sharing strategy at all sharing 265 percentages. Researchers would in this case choose to share even without measures to 266 promote sharing, simply because it directly increases their impact. 267 Second, it can be noted that in some subfigures of Figure 2 (a, b, In (a) are the gains and losses in impact, at default parameter values (Table 2 ). In (b-f) we 288 simulated measures to improve gains or limit losses. A possible desired effect of sharing of 289 datasets would be that every individual researcher can benefit, sharing or not sharing. It can 290 be observed that in Figure 3 PrePrints costs than in (c). This is because in (b) the probability of finding an appropriate dataset for 297 reuse f is set higher, compensating for the costs for sharing for more of the sharing 298 researchers. In (c) the time cost t r with reuse per paper is lower, benefitting only those few 299 that do find a reusable set. In (d) the lowering of the time cost t c for preparing a dataset for 300 sharing improves the situation for all sharing researchers compared to the default in (a), but 301 still some researchers are not fully compensated. In (e) the introduction of the citation 302 benefit b does not help much to improve the benefits for sharing researchers. Only when in 303 (f) a substantial citation benefit b is introduced for sharing researchers, the costs associated 304 with sharing are (more than) compensated for, for all sharing researchers. 305 When simulating community impact in Figure 4 (a) and (b) it can be seen that, as the 306 benefits b for sharing increase towards the right of the plot, the average community impact 307 increasingly starts to rise with more sharing in both plots. Even the drop after the initial 308 increase at increased sharing caused by the datasets saturation is eventually compensated 309 for with the increase of the citation benefit with sharing. Additional factors that may influence the outcome of this model and that could possibly be 388 incorporated in community specific versions or future refinements of this model include: 389 differences in quality of papers leading to differences in citation rates, heterogeneity in the 390 costs of sharing (small and easy versus big and complicated datasets to document), 391 heterogeneity in the contribution of a papers' dataset to the available pool of datasets, 392 feedback between the number of times a dataset is reused and the citation benefit for that 393 dataset. A focal point to assess in the current model would also be the pool of available 394 datasets. What is the relation between available datasets and reuse rate for researchers, do 395 these datasets overlap in content, will all new datasets contribute to science, does the pool 396 become saturated, are all datasets reused, what is the decay rate of datasets in the pool for 397 that specific community? 398 Lastly, it is clear that not all data can or should be made fully or immediately publicly 399 available for a variety of practical reasons (e.g., lack of interest, sheer volume and lack of 400 storage, cheap-to-recreate data, high time costs to prepare the data for reuse, the wish to PrePrints obtainable data such as the data underlying this paper, recreating it is probably cheaper than 407 storing and interpreting the datasheet. 408 In conclusion, we performed a game-theoretic analysis to provide structure and to 409 analyse problems of strategic data sharing. In the simulations there appeared a conflicting 410 interest for individual researchers, who are always better off not sharing and omitting the 411 sharing cost, while they are ultimately better off all sharing as a community. Although 412 policies should be able to increase the rate of sharing researchers, and increased 413 discoverability and dataset quality could partly compensate for costs, a better measure 414 would be to lower the costs for sharing, or even turn them into a (citation-) benefit. 415 416
